



# From Global Norms to Regional Practice: A Comparative Analysis of the Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda in ASEAN Member States

May May Maysarah<sup>1\*</sup>, M. Adnan Madjid<sup>1</sup>, Mitro Prihantoro<sup>1</sup>, Linus Yosep Wawan Rukmono<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Indonesia Defense University, Bogor, West Java 16810, Indonesia

\*Corresponding Author: may.maysarah@doktoral.idu.ac.id

## Abstract

This article presents a comparative qualitative analysis of how four ASEAN member states—the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar—implement the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda as set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 and its successor resolutions. Drawing on the frameworks of Feminist Security Studies and Acharya's Norm Localization Theory, the study examines how the global WPS norm is translated into diverse national and regional contexts through National Action Plans (WPS NAPs) and the newly adopted ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on WPS for the period 2023 to 2027. Departing from prior scholarship, which has been largely descriptive-narrative or single-country in focus (Cook & True, 2020; UN Women & ASEAN, 2021), this article develops a four-category typology of localization—deep localization, partial localization, ideological localization, and blocked localization—as a novel theoretical contribution to Acharya's (2004) Norm Localization Theory. To strengthen the empirical basis of this typology, the article draws on data from the Women, Peace and Security Index 2025/26 (GIWPS & PRIO, 2025), an internationally validated instrument comprising thirteen measurable indicators across three dimensions—inclusion, justice, and security—to map the comparative position of the four case countries. The analysis reveals significant variation in WPS commitment and implementation across the region, shaped by domestic political structures, conflict dynamics, and the degree of civil society engagement. The Philippines demonstrates the most advanced implementation trajectory, with a fourth-generation WPS NAP, whereas Myanmar has yet to establish a formal WPS framework amid ongoing armed conflict. Indonesia and Vietnam occupy intermediate positions with markedly different localization processes. The article argues that effective WPS implementation in ASEAN requires more than mere policy formalization; it demands the meaningful engagement of women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding at both grassroots and national levels. These findings contribute to the growing literature on the regionalization of WPS in Asia by addressing the theoretical and empirical gaps left by earlier studies, and offer practical implications for strengthening ASEAN's gender and security governance architecture within the 2023 to 2027 Regional Plan of Action cycle. The policy implications are directed at the ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW) and the ACWC with a view to strengthening accountability in the implementation of the Regional Plan of Action.

**Keywords:** Women, Peace and Security; ASEAN; UNSCR 1325; Norm Localization; National Action Plan; Southeast Asia; Feminist Security Studies

## INTRODUCTION

The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in October 2000 marked a historic milestone in the governance of international peace and security. For the first time, the Security Council formally recognized that women are not merely victims of armed conflict but active agents in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding. The resolution, together with the broader Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda it inaugurated, called upon member states to ensure the full



participation of women at all levels of decision-making in peace processes, to integrate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and to protect women and girls from conflict-related sexual violence.

More than two decades after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the gap between normative commitment and actual practice remains substantial, particularly in the Global South. In Southeast Asia—a region characterized by a diverse conflict landscape ranging from protracted armed insurgencies and post-conflict transitions to emerging civil crises—the WPS agenda has gained traction at differing speeds and depths across states. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which coordinates regional policy among its ten member states, adopted its first Regional Plan of Action on WPS in 2022 for the period 2023 to 2027. In December 2023, ASEAN, through the Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) in collaboration with UN Women, launched the Localization Toolkit and Guidelines as a derivative instrument of the Regional Plan of Action on WPS, designed to assist member states in aligning regional priorities with their respective national contexts (UN Women Asia-Pacific, 2023). The launch of this toolkit underscores that ASEAN itself now explicitly frames WPS implementation as a process of localization—an institutional acknowledgement that lends direct relevance to the application of Acharya's Norm Localization Theory in this article. This development signals a new phase in the regionalization of the WPS agenda, although questions regarding how each member state translates these global and regional norms into meaningful national practice remain largely underexplored.

The research gap addressed here is twofold. Empirically, the existing literature—including the ASEAN Regional Study on WPS (UN Women & ASEAN, 2021)—remains descriptive and based on single-point-in-time mapping, without an analytical framework that explains why states sharing the same ASEAN membership and exposed to identical regional norms produce markedly different implementation outcomes. Theoretically, the application of Acharya's (2004) Norm Localization Theory to the WPS domain has rarely been undertaken systematically. Most studies of norm localization in Southeast Asia focus on traditional security norms, such as non-interference and common security, or on single norms such as anti-female genital mutilation (Putri & Sundrijo, 2024), rather than on the WPS agenda, which is multidimensional and cross-pillar in nature. This article directly addresses both gaps: empirically, through an explanatory rather than merely descriptive comparative analysis of four cases selected purposively to span the spectrum of WPS institutionalization; and theoretically, through the development of a four-category typology of norm localization that is testable and replicable across other global norm domains.

This article addresses these gaps through a comparative qualitative analysis of WPS implementation in four ASEAN member states: the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. The four cases were selected purposively to represent the spectrum of WPS institutionalization in the region, ranging from a highly developed framework in the Philippines to the near-absence of a formal WPS structure in Myanmar, with Indonesia and Vietnam occupying intermediate positions. The study is guided by a central research question: how do ASEAN member states differ in their implementation of the WPS agenda, and what factors account for the variation in their commitment to UNSCR 1325?

Three sub-questions inform the analysis. First, which ASEAN member states have adopted a WPS NAP, and how substantive are its content and implementation? Second, which structural factors—domestic political order, conflict dynamics, and civil society engagement—explain the variation in WPS implementation? Third, how does the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on WPS shape or constrain implementation at the national level?

Relative to the three most pertinent strands of literature, the contribution of this article may be formulated as follows. First, in contrast to the regional mapping study by UN Women and ASEAN (2021), which is descriptive and synchronic, this article adds a causal-explanatory dimension concerning the sources of variation, as well as a diachronic dimension concerning how the trajectories of the four states have evolved from the adoption of their first NAPs to the era of the 2023 to 2027 Regional Plan of Action. Second, in contrast to Cook and True (2020), who analyze ASEAN as a single institutional entity and conclude that its rhetorical commitment is not matched by structural action, this article opens that black box at the member-state level and demonstrates that structural neglect is not a uniform condition but a spectrum shaped by

differing domestic conditions—a finding with significantly different policy implications. Third, in contrast to norm localization studies in Southeast Asia that generally yield a single narrative per case, as seen in Putri and Sundrijo (2024) on the anti-female genital mutilation norm, this article proposes a generalizable cross-case typology: deep, partial, ideological, and blocked localization. This typology fills a gap that Acharya himself (2004, 2011) acknowledged as a limitation of his original framework, namely the insufficient specification of the conditions that differentiate the degree and direction of localization outcomes. A similar limitation is noted by Putri and Sundrijo (2024), who observe that Acharya does not examine in detail the factors that support or hinder the localization process.

This article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature on WPS globally and in Asia and sets out the theoretical framework, combining Feminist Security Studies with Acharya's Norm Localization Theory, including the development of the four-category typology and a proposed WPS Index-based implementation indicator framework. The research method section outlines the logic of document selection and the thematic coding procedure. The results and discussion section presents the case analysis for each of the four states, followed by an analytical, rather than merely descriptive, comparative discussion. The conclusion sets out the findings, policy implications, and a future research agenda.

## LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### The Global WPS Agenda

The WPS agenda comprises a broad normative framework built on four pillars: participation, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery. Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, seven subsequent resolutions—1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, and 2242—have expanded and reinforced the agenda, particularly by focusing on the eradication of conflict-related sexual violence and the institutionalization of women's participation in formal peace negotiations (True & Shepherd, 2017). Scholars such as Cohn (2008) and Shepherd (2011) critically examine the tensions inherent in the WPS agenda, particularly the manner in which feminist aims may be co-opted within state-centric security discourse, thereby ultimately reproducing gender hierarchies.

National Action Plans have emerged as the principal policy instrument for translating WPS commitments into domestic practice. By 2025, more than one hundred states had adopted NAPs globally, although the quality, scope, and fidelity of their implementation vary considerably (UN Women, 2023). Research by Swaine (2015) and by Björkdahl and Selimovic (2015) highlights the persistent gap between NAP rhetoric and actual resource allocation, with civil society organizations frequently playing a crucial intermediary role between global norms and local realities.

Beyond NAPs, a number of regional organizations outside ASEAN—including the Pacific Islands Forum with its Pacific Regional Action Plan for the period 2012 to 2015—have developed comparable instruments. This positions ASEAN as one of approximately thirteen regional organizations that had launched a Regional Plan of Action on WPS by 2024 (Hamilton, 2025). This cross-regional comparative research indicates that Regional Plans of Action generally represent the collective view of a regional organization's membership, unlike NAPs, which represent the perspective of a single government—a structural distinction that is important for understanding why the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action was not designed to substitute for domestic political conditions.

### WPS in Asia and ASEAN

Academic scholarship on WPS in Asia remains relatively limited compared with studies focusing on the African or European contexts. Existing regional analyses tend to emphasize the structural constraints posed by ASEAN's non-interference norm, which has historically limited the organization's willingness to engage with domestic gender and security issues (Davies & True, 2017). Cook and True (2020) argue that ASEAN's approach to WPS is characterized by rhetorical commitment unaccompanied by adequate structural action, with member states preferring soft coordination over binding accountability mechanisms. This argument by Cook and True (2020) constitutes an important point of departure for the present article;

however, their analysis stops at the institutional level of ASEAN as a single unit of analysis. This article argues that such conclusions regarding structural neglect obscure substantial variation at the member-state level—variation that constitutes the core of the article's empirical contribution.

More recent scholarship has begun to examine the ASEAN Regional Study on Women, Peace and Security (UN Women & ASEAN, 2021), which documents significant variation among member states in women's representation within security institutions, peacebuilding processes, and conflict-affected communities. That study found that women's representation in law enforcement agencies ranges from six percent in Indonesia to twenty percent in Laos, and identified the limited documentation of women's grassroots peacebuilding contributions as a key gap (UN Women & ASEAN, 2021). Although valuable as a baseline mapping exercise, that study is methodologically descriptive-statistical and was not designed to explain the causal dynamics underlying the variation it documents—a space explicitly filled by the comparative theoretical framework of this article.

The regionalization of the WPS norm through ASEAN constitutes an emerging area of research. Otto (2016) and Ellerby (2013) note that regional organizations may either strengthen or dilute the global WPS norm, depending on their institutional character and the configuration of their member states. The adoption of the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on WPS in 2022, with a five-year roadmap for the period 2023 to 2027, represents a critical juncture requiring empirical assessment; yet academic analysis of its early implementation phase remains highly limited. A recent study by Hamilton (2025) in *International Affairs* compares the regionalization of WPS between ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum and concludes that both Regional Plans of Action function more as frameworks of normative legitimation for domestic actors than as binding accountability instruments—a finding consistent with, and empirically reinforced by, the case analysis in this article. Furthermore, the launch of ASEAN's Localization Toolkit and Guidelines in December 2023, and the member-state-level meeting in August 2024 to discuss localization experiences (UN Women Asia-Pacific, 2023), signal that ASEAN itself now recognizes implementation as a process highly dependent on national context, thereby reinforcing the relevance of the norm localization framework employed in this article over a simpler compliance framework.

At the theoretical level, several critiques of Acharya's localization framework are pertinent to the development of the typology in this article. Krook and True (2012), in their study of the life cycles of international norms and the UN's promotion of gender equality published in the *European Journal of International Relations*, argue that the norm localization framework tends to overlook the role of intermediate actors—parties that are not pure local norm-takers but that actively shape the process of norm adaptation through transnational networks and institutional capacity. In a similar vein, Cortell and Davis (2000), in their research-agenda study of the domestic impact of international norms published in the *International Studies Review*, identify that comparable frameworks are insufficiently specific in mapping the conditions that enable or hinder the process of norm internalization at the domestic level. These two methodological findings directly motivate the four-category typology developed below, which responds to these limitations by specifying three differentiating conditions—norm entrepreneurs, the congruence of the domestic legal framework, and the degree of conflict visibility—that systematically predict the direction in which the localization of a global norm, in this case WPS, will proceed.

This article contributes to filling these gaps by offering a systematic comparative analysis of four ASEAN member states at different stages of WPS institutionalization, with particular attention to the mechanisms and obstacles that shape localization outcomes.

### **Feminist Security Studies**

This study is rooted in the tradition of Feminist Security Studies, which challenges mainstream security paradigms by positioning gender as a critical analytical lens. Feminist Security Studies scholars argue that the concept of security in orthodox International Relations has historically been constructed on masculine norms and state-centric referents, thereby rendering women's insecurity—particularly in conflict situations—structurally invisible (Tickner, 1992; Enloe, 2000). From this perspective, the WPS agenda represents both

progressive normative advancement and a site of contestation, since it operates within the very state and multilateral structures that are the object of Feminist Security Studies critique.

For this comparative research, Feminist Security Studies provides a normative basis for interrogating whether WPS implementation genuinely transforms gendered power relations or merely adds women's presence to the existing security architecture, while also providing an analytical framework for evaluating the substantive content of NAPs and institutional practices across the four case studies.

### **Norm Localization Theory**

To explain the variation in WPS implementation across ASEAN member states, this article draws on Amitav Acharya's (2004, 2011) theory of constitutive localization. Acharya argues that global norms are not simply adopted wholesale by norm-taking states. Rather, local agents actively reconstruct and reassemble global norms to fit their own cognitive and identity frameworks through a process of congruence building, thereby producing alignment with pre-existing local normative frameworks and established institutional orders. This process of localization yields outcomes that may deviate significantly from the original normative content, yet remain a legitimate form of engagement with global standards. Acharya himself developed this framework from a case study of ASEAN security regionalism, in which the externally proposed norm of common security was reconstructed to align with the deeply embedded regional norms of non-interference and informal cooperation.

Despite its wide influence, Acharya's original framework leaves three limitations that are directly relevant to this study. First, Acharya (2004, p. 247) identifies only three conditions driving the localization process—economic crisis, systemic change, and the strength of local norms and beliefs—without explaining in detail how combinations of these conditions produce differing degrees of localization (Putri & Sundrijo, 2024). Second, the framework was designed for relatively simple single norms—for example, a regional security norm or an anti-female genital mutilation norm—rather than for a multidimensional agenda such as WPS, which consists of four pillars that may be localized unevenly relative to one another within the same state. Third, the original framework pays insufficient attention to the possibility that the localization process may be actively halted by political rupture, such as a coup—a condition qualitatively distinct from the resistance or rejection discussed by Acharya, because political rupture may eliminate the domestic preconditions for localization itself rather than merely reject its content.

Applied to the WPS agenda in ASEAN, Norm Localization Theory predicts that the degree and character of WPS implementation will vary according to three factors. First, the presence of domestic norm entrepreneurs—civil society actors, women's organizations, and supportive state officials—who advocate for the localization of WPS. Second, the congruence of the WPS norm with existing domestic legal frameworks and cultural practices. Third, the degree of visibility of ongoing or recent conflict, which creates both urgency and opportunity for the institutionalization of WPS. This framework enables the research to move beyond a simple compliance/non-compliance dichotomy toward a richer understanding of the processes through which the WPS norm is contested, adapted, and embedded across diverse national contexts.

### **A Four-Category Typology of WPS Localization**

On the basis of the three driving conditions above—norm entrepreneurs, domestic legal-normative congruence, and the degree of conflict visibility—this article develops a four-category typology that maps combinations of these conditions onto four qualitatively distinct localization trajectories, rather than trajectories differing merely by degree along a single linear scale. This typology is derived inductively from cross-case analysis and then abstracted into a generalizable framework in this section so that it may be tested on global norm domains beyond WPS.

**Deep Localization.** This category occurs when all three driving conditions are simultaneously present and mutually reinforcing: strong and organized domestic norm entrepreneurs; a domestic legal framework that is substantively—not merely formally—congruent with the global norm; and a sustained degree of conflict visibility that maintains political will. The outcome is a global norm that is not only adopted textually but also absorbed into institutional structures, budgets, and routine bureaucratic practice, as seen in the case

of the Philippines. Its empirical markers include successive NAP cycles with substantive improvements between cycles, functioning monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and explicit linkage to formal peace processes.

**Partial Localization.** This category occurs when the norm is formally and institutionally adopted, but one of the three driving conditions is weak or uneven across the state's regions and sectors—typically owing to non-uniform legal-normative congruence, that is, strong at the national level but weak in the security sector or in regions with strong customary and religious governance, as seen in the case of Indonesia. Its empirical markers include an existing NAP whose implementation varies sharply across regions and sectors, low representation of women in security institutions, and a high dependence on civil society initiatives without adequate state budgetary support.

**Ideological Localization.** This category occurs when norm entrepreneurs originate from, or are channeled exclusively through, the state or party apparatus, and the global norm is reconstructed through an established ideological framework—such as nationalism and state collectivism—so that formal compliance is achieved while limiting the normative dissonance that autonomous feminist advocacy might otherwise generate, as seen in the case of Vietnam. Its empirical markers include a NAP adopted through a single state institutional channel, the framing of women's participation as a collective and nationalist contribution rather than as an individual right, and the absence of autonomous space for independent feminist civil society organizations.

**Blocked Localization.** This category occurs when the domestic preconditions for localization—political openness, civil society space, and a functioning institutional framework—are destroyed or never formed in the first place, so that the localization process cannot proceed at all, rather than merely proceeding slowly or superficially, as seen in the case of Myanmar. This category is qualitatively distinct from the norm resistance discussed in earlier localization literature (Acharya, 2004; Putri & Sundrijo, 2024), because resistance presupposes the existence of a state or local actor actively rejecting the norm's content, whereas blocked localization occurs when the actors' capacity to engage with the norm collapses entirely as a result of political rupture, such as a coup or civil war. Its empirical markers include the absence of a formal NAP, the sudden—rather than gradual—loss of civil society space, and the complete migration of women's peace agency into the informal, non-state, or resistance domain.

Table 2 summarizes these four categories according to the combination of the three driving conditions and their empirical markers, and may be used by other researchers as an initial classification instrument for WPS cases beyond the four states examined in this article, as well as for other global norm domains.

### Empirical Data: The WPS Index 2025/26 as a Comparative Basis

To strengthen the empirical basis of the four-category typology of WPS localization, this article draws on data from the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Index 2025/26 published by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) in collaboration with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). The Index is a widely recognized global instrument that measures the status of women through thirteen indicators grouped into three dimensions: inclusion (education, financial inclusion, employment, mobile phone use, and parliamentary representation); justice (absence of legal discrimination, access to justice, maternal mortality, and son bias); and security (intimate partner violence, community safety, political violence targeting women, and proximity to conflict). With scores ranging from 0 to 1 across 181 countries, the WPS Index 2025/26 provides verified data relevant to the four case countries in this article: Vietnam ranks 73rd (score 0.721), Indonesia 96th (score 0.678), the Philippines 131st (score 0.607), and Myanmar 172nd (score 0.442) (GIWPS & PRIO, 2025). This ordering of scores corresponds consistently with the proposed localization typology, in which states with higher scores exhibit more conducive conditions for localization, as analyzed in greater detail in the case studies in the results and discussion section.

The Participation dimension comprises three indicators: the percentage of women in police and military institutions; the percentage of women in formal peace negotiation delegations or panels; and the existence of legally binding affirmative quotas or targets.

The Prevention dimension comprises three indicators: the existence of a gender-sensitive early warning system; an identifiable national budget allocation for gender-sensitive peace education; and the integration of gender modules into the pre-deployment training of peacekeeping forces.

The Protection dimension comprises three indicators: the existence and enforcement of conflict-related sexual violence legislation; the number of conflict-related sexual violence cases legally prosecuted each year; and the availability of accessible psychosocial and legal support services in conflict areas.

The Relief and Recovery dimension comprises three indicators: the proportion of humanitarian funding marked as gender-responsive; the existence of direct funding mechanisms for grassroots women's peace organizations; and the systematic documentation of women's informal peacebuilding contributions.

Each indicator may be scored zero for absent, one for present in a formal or rhetorical sense, and two for present and substantively functioning, thereby producing a composite score between zero and twenty-four that can map a state's position on the localization typology with greater precision than qualitative assessment alone. Preliminary estimates based on qualitative data place the Philippines in the high range, between sixteen and eighteen; Indonesia and Vietnam in the intermediate range, between nine and twelve; and Myanmar in the very low range, between zero and two. These scores are indicative and require verification through structured primary data collection. This study recommends that the ASEAN ACWC consider adapting such a framework as an official monitoring instrument for the mid-term review cycle of the WPS Regional Plan of Action 2023 to 2027.

## RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a comparative qualitative case study design, following the most-different systems logic of comparison set out by Przeworski and Teune (1970). The four selected cases—the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar—share ASEAN membership and thus face a similar regional normative environment, yet differ substantially in their domestic political systems, conflict histories, and degrees of WPS institutionalization. This variation enables the research to identify the factors explaining differences in implementation outcomes, rather than merely documenting them.

### Logic and Criteria for Document Selection

The document corpus was constructed through purposive sampling guided by the four-pillar WPS framework and the three driving conditions of localization, rather than through random sampling, since the aim of the research is an in-depth understanding of causal mechanisms across a small number of cases rather than statistical generalization. The document inclusion criteria comprise three elements. First, official policy documents published or revised on or after the year of adoption of each state's NAP or National Strategic Plan, up to June 2026. Second, reports by international organizations, such as UN Women and the ACWC, that explicitly address one of the four case countries in the WPS context. Third, journal articles indexed in Scopus or Web of Science, or academic books published by university presses, concerning WPS, ASEAN, or gender politics in Southeast Asia, with priority given to publications from 2017 to 2025 while still including theoretically relevant foundational texts predating 2017. The exclusion criteria comprise popular news sources lacking primary documentary value, which are used only as chronological markers; policy documents of ASEAN member states outside the four selected cases, except for purposes of regional contextualization; and grey literature without verifiable author or institutional attribution.

### Analytical Procedure and Thematic Coding

The document analysis employs thematic analysis following the structured approach of Braun and Clarke, adapted for comparative policy research, through a three-stage procedure. The first stage, deductive coding, applies a coding framework derived from the four WPS pillars (participation, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery) and the three driving conditions of localization (norm entrepreneurs, domestic legal congruence, and degree of conflict visibility) as initial coding categories. The second stage, inductive coding, identifies themes emerging from the data but not yet captured by the initial deductive framework—for example, the theme of the grassroots gap. The third stage, cross-case synthesis, maps the codes onto a

comparison matrix and evaluates the combinations of codes against the localization typology for each case. Triangulation was conducted by comparing claims in official policy documents against independent reports, such as those of UN Women and the ACWC, as well as secondary academic literature for each case, in order to mitigate the risk of bias arising from official representation alone.

Data collection drew on three principal types of sources. First, official policy documents, including national WPS NAPs, government reports to the UN, and ASEAN-level strategy documents, including the ASEAN Localization Toolkit and Guidelines (UN Women Asia-Pacific, 2023). Second, reports and evaluations produced by international organizations, including UN Women, the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR), and the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN). Third, peer-reviewed academic literature on WPS, ASEAN, and gender politics in Southeast Asia. The document analysis followed a structured thematic approach organized around the four WPS pillars, thereby enabling systematic cross-case comparison.

This study acknowledges several limitations. First, primary fieldwork and elite interviews are beyond the scope of this article, so the findings are mediated by the available documentary sources, which may reflect official rather than grassroots perspectives. The WPS Index data employed (GIWPS & PRIO, 2025) provide internationally verified measurements, yet their indicators are drawn from aggregate national data and thus do not fully capture the dynamics of NAP implementation at the community and grassroots levels—a gap that subsequent primary field research will need to address. Second, the exclusion of the six other ASEAN member states—Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand—limits the generalizability of the comparative findings to the region as a whole, although Thailand's recent launch of its first WPS NAP for the period 2024 to 2027 in late 2025 (UN Women Asia-Pacific, 2026) indicates that additional comparative cases are now available for future research. Notwithstanding these limitations, this four-case comparison offers substantial analytical leverage on the factors driving variation in WPS implementation within a regionally highly significant context. Future research should expand this comparative scope, as further elaborated in the conclusion.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### The Philippines: A Regional Pioneer in WPS Institutionalization

The Philippines represents the most advanced case of WPS institutionalization among ASEAN member states. The country's engagement with the WPS agenda is rooted in a long-established feminist civil society movement and a high degree of armed conflict visibility, particularly in Mindanao, which has provided sustained impetus for WPS advocacy. The Philippines adopted its first WPS NAP in 2010, making it one of the earliest adopters in Southeast Asia, and has since progressed through four successive NAP cycles, with the fourth NAP covering the period 2023 to 2033 (Philippine Commission on Women, 2023).

Each successive NAP demonstrates qualitative advancement in both scope and ambition. The current fourth NAP is notable for explicitly integrating a whole-of-society approach engaging all elements of society; recognizing the diverse experiences of women, including Indigenous women, women with disabilities, and women from conflict-affected communities; and incorporating monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that were largely absent from earlier iterations. The Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) serves as the institutional anchor for NAP implementation, working in collaboration with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law of 2018 and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created a context-specific institutional architecture for WPS. Women were formally included in the Bangsamoro peace negotiation panels, and the Bangsamoro Women Commission was established to institutionalize gender mainstreaming in the new autonomous region. However, scholars such as McKay and Santos (2020) caution against overstating women's substantive influence in the peace process, since formal inclusion does not automatically entail meaningful agency over outcomes.

The findings of McKay and Santos (2020) merit critical analysis rather than mere citation. They indicate that even in the region's most advanced case of deep localization, the gap between formal inclusion

and substantive agency persists. This reinforces the Feminist Security Studies argument that the institutional formalization of WPS—even in a best case such as the Philippines—does not automatically equalize gendered power relations. Such formalization may simultaneously represent normative advancement and reproduce structures that constrain women's substantive agency—a tension that recurs as a theme across all four cases in this article.

Applying the norm localization framework, the Philippine case illustrates a high level of norm entrepreneur activity, led by organizations such as Women Engaged in Action on 1325 (WE Act 1325), combined with a domestic legal framework—particularly the Magna Carta of Women of 2009—that is highly compatible with WPS principles. The visibility of conflict in Mindanao continues to sustain the political will for WPS investment, thereby producing what this study terms deep localization: a condition in which the WPS norm is not only adopted textually but substantively absorbed into domestic institutional structures rather than remaining a merely rhetorical commitment.

### **Indonesia: Incremental Progress Amid Structural Constraints**

Indonesia occupies an intermediate position in the ASEAN WPS landscape. As the world's third-largest democracy and ASEAN's most populous member state, Indonesia's approach to the WPS agenda is shaped by a complex interplay of decentralized governance, religious and customary norms, and a post-authoritarian political transition that has expanded civil society space while also preserving powerful institutional actors resistant to gender reform.

Indonesia adopted its first WPS NAP in 2014, with subsequent revisions in 2019 and 2022. The current NAP reflects a broader institutional mandate, with the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (KemenPPPA) serving as the principal coordinating body. Its key thematic areas include the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence, particularly in Papua and other conflict-prone regions, as well as the promotion of women's participation in conflict mediation and community reconciliation processes. Indonesia has also been active in international WPS fora, including as a co-sponsor of key UN Security Council resolutions on WPS.

Nonetheless, implementation faces significant structural challenges. Women's representation in the Indonesian National Police (Polri) was recorded at approximately six percent in 2023, among the lowest in ASEAN (UN Women & ASEAN, 2021), thereby limiting institutional capacity to mainstream a gender perspective in security sector operations. In Papua, where a low-intensity armed conflict has persisted for decades, the WPS framework has limited operational reach, and women's grassroots peacebuilding contributions remain largely undocumented and unsupported.

From a norm localization perspective, Indonesia exhibits what Acharya terms partial localization: a condition in which the WPS norm has been formally institutionalized but encounters significant resistance in its translation into practice, particularly in the security sector and in regions with strong customary or religious governance structures. The role of Islamic civil society organizations—both as advocates for and as impediments to the WPS norm—is an underexamined dimension of Indonesia's WPS trajectory and warrants further attention.

The case of the anti-female genital mutilation norm in Gorontalo examined by Putri and Sundrijo (2024) provides an instructive point of comparison, outside the WPS domain but within the same Indonesian context. That study found that the strength of local religious and customary beliefs, rather than the absence of norm entrepreneurs, was the principal impediment to deep localization—consistent with the analysis of partial WPS localization in this section. This pattern indicates that the constraints on global norm localization in Indonesia are not specific to WPS alone but reflect a broader structural pattern in the interaction between global and local norms in a state with strong legal and religious pluralism—a finding that reinforces the generalizability of this typology beyond the WPS domain.

### **Vietnam: A Late Adopter with a Distinctive Localization Logic**

Vietnam represents a distinctive case in the ASEAN WPS landscape. As a one-party socialist state, Vietnam's engagement with the WPS agenda is filtered through a particular form of state feminism—a

tradition in which the Vietnam Women's Union (Hội Liên hiệp Phụ nữ Việt Nam, Hội LHPN) serves as the principal institutional channel for women's political engagement under the guidance of the Communist Party. Vietnam adopted its first WPS NAP in 2024, making it a relatively late adopter among ASEAN member states, yet one that reflects a deliberate, state-directed approach to norm localization.

Vietnam's NAP explicitly draws on the state's historical narrative of women's contributions to the national liberation struggle—a powerful domestic framing that resonates with the WPS participation pillar, yet is articulated within a nationalist rather than feminist rights-based frame. This framing reflects a broader pattern in Vietnamese gender policy, in which women's agency is valued within a collectivist frame rather than through the discourse of individual rights (Bélanger & Khuất, 2008).

Vietnam's security context differs from that of the Philippines and Indonesia in the absence of active domestic armed conflict, which reduces the immediate urgency of conflict-oriented WPS provisions but may also constrain the domestic political will for sustained WPS investment. Vietnam's growing engagement in UN peacekeeping operations, with the deployment of women officers to UN missions in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, represents an evolving dimension of Vietnamese WPS practice that connects national policy to international commitments. Consistent with the inter-state learning encouraged by the ASEAN Localization Toolkit, Vietnam is recorded as having undertaken comparative WPS NAP study visits to Jordan and the United Kingdom (UN Women Asia-Pacific, 2023)—an indication that Vietnam's state norm entrepreneurs actively seek external institutional models compatible with their domestic ideological framework, rather than rejecting engagement with the global norm altogether.

The Vietnamese case exemplifies what this study terms ideological localization: a condition in which the WPS norm is adopted and reassembled through an existing state ideology that emphasizes women's collective contribution and state-led mobilization rather than transformative feminist politics. This form of localization achieves formal compliance with the WPS framework while limiting the normative dissonance that more autonomous feminist advocacy might generate.

### **Myanmar: WPS Amid Conflict Crisis, Coup, and Normative Rupture**

Myanmar presents the most striking case of failed WPS institutionalization in ASEAN. Although the decade of political opening between 2011 and 2021 saw limited progress toward WPS engagement—including the drafting of the National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women (NSPAW) for the period 2013 to 2022—the military coup of February 2021 effectively dismantled the nascent gender governance architecture and plunged the country into acute armed conflict.

Myanmar has not yet adopted a formal WPS NAP. The NSPAW, drafted before the coup, contained several WPS-relevant provisions but fell far short of a complete WPS framework, lacking explicit linkage to UNSCR 1325 or the four WPS pillars (UN Women, 2023). Following the coup, the military junta, which styled itself the State Administration Council, has demonstrated no engagement with international WPS norms, and the space for the civil society organizations that had previously been the principal drivers of WPS advocacy during the transition period has been drastically constrained. Myanmar's participation in ASEAN mechanisms itself has, since the coup, been de facto suspended at the highest level—namely the attendance of heads of state or government at ASEAN summits—so that the junta's access to regional WPS fora, including the WPS Regional Plan of Action coordination meetings, has been practically foreclosed. This condition reinforces Myanmar's normative isolation from the ongoing process of WPS regionalization.

Nevertheless, the Myanmar case is not simply one of normative absence. Women have played an extraordinary role in the Civil Disobedience Movement and in armed resistance through the People's Defense Forces, thereby demonstrating forms of agency and participation that the WPS agenda seeks to recognize but that fall outside its formal institutional framework. Feminist scholars argue that the WPS agenda's focus on formal peace negotiations and state institutions renders such forms of women's political and armed agency largely invisible (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011).

The Myanmar case thus challenges the WPS framework from two directions. The absence of state engagement reveals the framework's dependence on cooperative state actors, while women's active role in

resistance politics reveals its conceptual limitations in capturing the full spectrum of women's peace and security agency. From a norm localization perspective, Myanmar represents blocked localization: a condition in which the domestic preconditions necessary for norm internalization—political openness, civil society space, and a compatible institutional framework—have been systematically destroyed.

This section would be strengthened by verified data on the number and proportion of women in the command structures of the People's Defense Forces and the parallel National Unity Government, as well as by systematic documentation by exile-based Myanmar women's organizations—for example, the Women's League of Burma—concerning post-coup conflict-related sexual violence. Both aspects are at present referenced only narratively and are not yet supported by fully verifiable primary or secondary data citations in this article, and thus constitute one of the empirical data agendas still required for future research.

### Comparative Discussion

Table 1 presents a structured comparative overview of WPS implementation across the four case studies along eleven key dimensions, summarizing the findings from the individual case analyses above.

Table 1. Comparative Overview of Women, Peace and Security Implementation in Selected ASEAN Member States

| Dimension                                             | Philippines                                    | Indonesia                                   | Vietnam                            | Myanmar                                           |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| <b>WPS NAP status</b>                                 | 4th NAP (2023–2033)                            | 3rd NAP (2022–2024)                         | 1st NAP (2024)                     | No NAP yet                                        |
| <b>Lead institution</b>                               | Philippine Commission on Women (PCW)           | KemenPPPA                                   | Hội LHPN (Vietnam Women's Union)   | None (SAC junta)                                  |
| <b>Conflict context</b>                               | Active (Mindanao); BARM transition             | Low intensity (Papua)                       | Post-conflict; active UN missions  | Active civil war (post-2021 coup)                 |
| <b>Role of civil society</b>                          | High (WE Act 1325, and others)                 | Moderate (limited in the regions)           | State-directed (via Hội LHPN)      | Very limited (exile-based)                        |
| <b>Women in security institutions</b>                 | Approx. 14% (PNP)                              | Approx. 6% (Polri), lowest in ASEAN         | Approx. 10% (military and police)  | Data unavailable (junta control)                  |
| <b>WPS participation pillar</b>                       | Strong (formal inclusion in negotiations)      | Moderate (national; weak in regions)        | Moderate (nationalist framing)     | No formal channel                                 |
| <b>WPS prevention pillar</b>                          | Strong (early warning system, peace education) | Moderate (NAP provisions, weak enforcement) | Emerging (PKO training)            | None                                              |
| <b>WPS protection pillar</b>                          | Strong (BOL, BARM provisions)                  | Moderate (laws exist, gaps in Papua)        | Moderate (limited legal framework) | Critical failure (SAC as perpetrator of violence) |
| <b>Grassroots documentation</b>                       | Moderate (improving)                           | Weak (underfunded)                          | Weak (state-centric focus)         | None (impossible under the junta)                 |
| <b>Localization type (adapted from Acharya, 2004)</b> | Deep localization                              | Partial localization                        | Ideological localization           | Blocked localization                              |
| <b>ASEAN RPA engagement</b>                           | High (co-drafted the RPA)                      | Moderate (active signatory)                 | Moderate (state-level engagement)  | Minimal (near-suspended from ASEAN)               |
| <b>WPS maturity level</b>                             | Advanced (5/5)                                 | Developing (3/5)                            | Nascent (2/5)                      | Critical gap (1/5)                                |

### Patterns of Variation

The four case analyses reveal a clear spectrum of WPS institutionalization within ASEAN, shaped by three principal explanatory factors: the presence and capacity of domestic norm entrepreneurs (particularly civil society organizations and feminist advocacy networks); the congruence of the WPS norm with existing domestic legal and political frameworks; and the degree of visibility of ongoing conflict as a driver of political will for WPS investment.

The Philippines scores highest on all three dimensions: a dynamic feminist civil society, a supportive legal framework, and a protracted conflict that sustains the political demand for WPS engagement. Indonesia presents a more mixed picture, with fairly substantial civil society capacity but a legal framework that is partly incompatible with feminist WPS aims in conflict regions, while conflict visibility has declined as major post-New Order conflicts in Aceh and Maluku have been resolved. Vietnam's WPS engagement is driven primarily by state actors operating within an ideological framework that accommodates the WPS norm selectively, while Myanmar's conditions for WPS localization have been fundamentally disrupted by the 2021 coup.

A descriptive reading of this pattern tends to stop at the observation that states with stronger civil societies implement more effectively. The analytical reading offered by the four-category localization typology reveals something more nuanced: the three driving conditions are not mutually substitutable but must be simultaneously present to produce deep localization. Indonesia possesses a relatively strong civil society yet remains locked in partial localization owing to uneven legal-normative congruence, thereby demonstrating that high civil society capacity alone is insufficient without correspondingly high normative congruence. Conversely, Vietnam demonstrates that high formal compliance with the WPS norm can be achieved without an autonomous civil society, provided that state norm entrepreneurs are sufficiently strong—although the outcome is a qualitatively different localization, namely ideological rather than deep, because the foundation of its feminist agency differs. This comparison indicates that the degree of localization (from shallow to deep) and the direction of localization (from autonomous to ideological) constitute two independent axes rather than a single continuum—an analytical distinction that appears neither in Acharya's (2004) original framework nor in the descriptive mapping study of UN Women and ASEAN (2021), and that constitutes this article's principal conceptual contribution to Norm Localization Theory.

#### *The Role of the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action*

The ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on WPS for the period 2023 to 2027 represents an important institutional development, yet its capacity to drive implementation at the national level remains constrained by ASEAN's fundamental non-interference principle and its preference for non-binding, consensus-based commitments. The Regional Plan of Action sets out a five-year roadmap with thematic priorities—including women's leadership, conflict prevention, and protection—but includes no accountability mechanisms, monitoring frameworks, or consequences for non-compliance. Its derivative instrument, the Localization Toolkit and Guidelines, launched by the ACWC together with UN Women in Phnom Penh in December 2023, reinforces this pattern. The toolkit provides technical guidance for member states to adapt the Regional Plan of Action to their national contexts but deliberately omits binding performance targets or mandatory reporting timelines, consistent with ASEAN's preference for national implementation sovereignty (UN Women Asia-Pacific, 2023). The member-state-level meeting in August 2024 to discuss localization experiences functioned as a forum for the exchange of experience rather than an evaluative peer-review forum.

For Norm Localization Theory, the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action functions as a regional normative framework in Acharya's terms. It provides a legitimating reference point for national WPS advocates and creates an enabling environment for localization, but it cannot substitute for the domestic political conditions that ultimately determine the depth of implementation. The Regional Plan of Action is most likely to accelerate WPS implementation in states responsive to ASEAN-level signals, such as Vietnam, while its impact is limited in contexts where domestic conditions are structurally unfavorable, such as Myanmar. This finding converges with Hamilton's (2025) comparative analysis of the ASEAN and Pacific Islands Forum Regional Plans of Action, which likewise concludes that Regional Plans of Action generally function as mechanisms of normative legitimation rather than accountability. This article extends that finding by demonstrating empirically how such legitimation mechanisms interact differently with different domestic conditions at the level of individual member states—something not captured by inter-Regional Plan of Action comparisons at the aggregate level.

*The Grassroots Gap*

Across all four cases, a consistent finding is the gap between formal WPS policy and women's engagement at the grassroots level. The ASEAN Regional Study on WPS (UN Women & ASEAN, 2021) identifies the limited documentation of women's grassroots peacebuilding as a key regional challenge. This gap reflects a broader tension within the WPS agenda: between a liberal feminist orientation emphasizing formal institutional inclusion and a more transformative feminist potential that requires restructuring the gendered power relations that lie at the root of conflict and insecurity themselves.

In Mindanao, women's community-based peace committees have operated for decades outside the formal NAP framework. In Papua, Indigenous women play a crucial role in community reconciliation without formal institutional recognition. In Myanmar, women's role in the resistance movement operates entirely outside the state WPS architecture. Bridging the grassroots gap requires not only documenting and funding such activities but also reconceptualizing the WPS framework to recognize informal and non-state forms of women's peace agency.

The community safety and intimate partner violence dimensions recorded in the WPS Index (GIWPS & PRIO, 2025)—which show Myanmar's community safety score falling far below those of Vietnam and Indonesia—particularly illustrate the gap between formal normative commitment and the reality of women's security at the grassroots level. Future research is advised to consider constructing a network map of grassroots peacebuilding actors for each country, visualizing informal and grassroots women's organizations, their linkages to formal norm entrepreneurs such as the PCW, KemenPPPA, and Hội LHPN, and their degree of institutional recognition. Such a visualization would empirically strengthen the textual argument in this section and merits inclusion in a follow-up study once primary network data become available.

**CONCLUSION**

This article has presented a comparative analysis of WPS implementation in four ASEAN member states, guided by Feminist Security Studies and Norm Localization Theory. The findings indicate that variation in WPS implementation is most accurately understood as a function of domestic political conditions, the capacity of civil society norm entrepreneurs, the congruence of WPS with existing legal frameworks, and the degree of conflict visibility, rather than as a simple function of formal commitment or the regional normative environment alone.

Three contributions to scholarship emerge from this analysis. First, the study provides an empirically grounded comparative assessment of WPS implementation in ASEAN at the critical juncture of the early implementation phase of the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action 2023 to 2027, drawing on verified data from the WPS Index 2025/26 (GIWPS & PRIO, 2025) as a cross-country comparative baseline. Second, the study advances the theoretical application of Norm Localization Theory to the WPS domain by developing a four-category localization typology—deep, partial, ideological, and blocked—constructed on the basis of three differentiating conditions (norm entrepreneurs, domestic legal congruence, and degree of conflict visibility) and potentially applicable beyond the Southeast Asian context. Third, the study highlights the grassroots gap as a structural limitation of the current WPS framework in ASEAN and offers a conceptual basis for addressing it through the deepening of civil society engagement in the national WPS policy cycle.

For policymakers, these findings carry several implications. ASEAN member states with more advanced WPS frameworks, particularly the Philippines, should be positioned as regional knowledge hubs that share lessons on NAP development and civil society engagement with newer adopters such as Vietnam. The ASEAN Regional Plan of Action should be strengthened with accountability mechanisms and regular peer-review processes to create meaningful incentives for national implementation. Concretely, this study recommends that the ACWC integrate the WPS Index data (GIWPS & PRIO, 2025) which already cover all ASEAN member states with thirteen verified indicators from independent international sources as a monitoring reference in the mid-term review of the Regional Plan of Action, so that normative commitments can be monitored in measurable terms without the need to build a new instrument and without violating the

non-interference principle, since the data are public and maintained by a third-party academic institution. Most importantly, funding and institutional recognition for women's grassroots peacebuilding activities need to be substantially increased across the region.

The Myanmar case serves as a stark reminder that WPS implementation cannot be sustained without the basic political conditions of democratic governance, the rule of law, and civil society freedom. As the international community continues to respond to the crisis in Myanmar, ensuring that WPS norms inform the humanitarian response and post-conflict planning including through engagement with women-led civil society organizations operating from exile will be crucial to any meaningful peacebuilding process.

Future research should expand the comparative scope to include the six remaining ASEAN member states, including Thailand, which recently launched its first WPS NAP for the period 2024 to 2027 in late 2025 (UN Women Asia-Pacific, 2026) and could serve as a valuable fifth comparative case—particularly for testing whether the partial localization typology can capture the early trajectory of WPS norm adoption in the context of a state without a significant history of armed conflict. Further research should also integrate primary fieldwork and interviews with grassroots women peacebuilders, as well as assess the implementation of the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action as it evolves throughout the 2023 to 2027 cycle. Systematically testing the four-category localization typology on such additional cases, using future editions of the WPS Index (GIWPS & PRIO) as a consistent and comparable empirical baseline, would significantly strengthen the external validity of the conceptual framework proposed in this article. The regionalization of the WPS agenda in Southeast Asia is a dynamic and contested process, so that sustained scholarly engagement will be essential both to understanding and to advancing it.

## REFERENCES

- Acharya, A. (2004). How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism. *International Organization*, 58(2), 239–275.
- Acharya, A. (2011). Norm subsidiarity and regional orders: Sovereignty, regionalism, and rule-making in the third world. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(1), 95–123.
- Bélanger, D., & Khuất, T. H. (2008). Social policies and the challenges of Doi Moi. In B. Womack (Ed.), *Vietnam's new order*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Björkdahl, A., & Selimovic, J. M. (2015). Gendering agency in transitional justice. *Security Dialogue*, 46(2), 165–182.
- Cohn, C. (2008). Mainstreaming gender in UN security policy: A path to political transformation? In S. M. Rai & G. Waylen (Eds.), *Global governance: Feminist perspectives*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cook, S., & True, J. (2020). The ASEAN regional architecture and the women, peace and security agenda: More than a footnote? *Global Governance*, 26(3), 463–487.
- Cortell, A. P., & Davis, J. W. (2000). Understanding the domestic impact of international norms: A research agenda. *International Studies Review*, 2(1), 65–87. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.00184>
- Davies, S. E., & True, J. (Eds.). (2017). *The Oxford handbook of women, peace, and security*. Oxford University Press.
- Ellerby, K. (2013). (En)gendered security? The complexities of women's inclusion in peace processes. *International Interactions*, 39(4), 435–460.
- Enloe, C. (2000). *Maneuvers: The international politics of militarizing women's lives*. University of California Press.
- Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS), & Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). (2025). *Women, Peace and Security Index 2025/26*. GIWPS and PRIO. <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/the-index>
- Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, & Peace Research Institute Oslo. (2025). *Women, Peace and Security Index 2025/26* [PDF]. Georgetown University. <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/WPS-Index-2025-Report.pdf>

- Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, & Peace Research Institute Oslo. (2025). *Women, Peace and Security Index 2025/26: Data* [Data set]. Georgetown University. <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/WPS-Index-2025-Data.xlsx>
- Hamilton, C. (2025). The regionalization of women, peace and security: ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum. *International Affairs*, 101(6), 2173–2196.
- Krook, M. L., & True, J. (2012). Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality. *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(1), 103–127. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110380439>
- McKay, S., & Santos, S. (2020). Women and peacebuilding in Mindanao: Challenges and opportunities. *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, 8(1), 25–47.
- Otto, D. (2016). Women, peace and security: A critical analysis of the Security Council's vision. In F. Ní Aoláin et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of gender and conflict*. Oxford University Press.
- Philippine Commission on Women. (2023). *Fourth national action plan on women, peace, and security 2023–2033*. PCW.
- Pratt, N., & Richter-Devroe, S. (2011). Critically examining UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13(4), 489–503.
- Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). *The logic of comparative social inquiry*. Wiley-Interscience.
- Putri, S. D., & Sundrijo, D. A. (2024). Understanding Acharya's concept on norms localization: A lesson learned from localization of transnational norms on anti-female genital mutilation in Gorontalo, Indonesia. *International Journal of Social Science and Human Research*, 7(2), 920–930.
- Shepherd, L. J. (2011). Sex, security and superhero(in)es: From 1325 to 1820 and beyond. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13(4), 504–521.
- Swaine, A. (2015). *Assessing the state of affairs of national action plans*. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security.
- Tickner, J. A. (1992). *Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*. Columbia University Press.
- True, J., & Shepherd, L. J. (2017). The politics of implementing WPS: The challenges of accountability. In S. E. Davies & J. True (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of women, peace, and security*. Oxford University Press.
- UN Women Asia-Pacific. (2023). *ASEAN launches guidelines for member countries to adapt women, peace and security policy (Localization toolkit and guidelines for the ASEAN regional plan of action on WPS)*. UN Women.
- UN Women Asia-Pacific. (2026). *Thailand launches its first national action plan on women, peace and security*. UN Women.
- UN Women, & ASEAN. (2021). *ASEAN regional study on women, peace and security*. UN Women Asia-Pacific and ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation.
- UN Women. (2023). *Women, peace and security: National action plans*. UN Women.
- UNSCR 1325. (2000). *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security*. S/RES/1325 (2000). United Nations.

